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THE TRANSVAAL WAR AND EUROPEAN OPINION.

BY KARL BLIND.

I.

ALL Europe is united in condemning the attack made by the English Government upon the independence of the South African Republic, in violation of the clearest treaty rights solemnly guaranteed in London in 1884. In Germany, men of most diverse parties—from the moderate Constitutional, or even Conservative, to the advanced Liberal and Democrat—those that favor a Colonial policy as well as those who oppose or bitterly attack it—are of one mind in this matter. They all say: The war which is now raging over the fair fields of South Africa cries aloud against the outrageous conduct of those in power in England.

The most indignant among them bring to recollection the telegram which Emperor William sent to President Krüger after the defeat of Dr. Jameson's Raid. Here I may state at once a little-known fact. That telegram, generally supposed to have come from the Kaiser's personal initiative, was practically an answer to a message addressed to him by four hundred Germans at Pretoria who had offered themselves to President Krüger as a volunteer corps for the defense of the Republic. They had asked the Kaiser, on the arrival of the first news about the Raid, whether he would not say a word in favor of the threatened Boer Commonwealth.

It will be remembered that Krüger and the other members of the Transvaal Deputation, after having concluded the new Treaty in London, in 1883-4, went to Berlin for a visit. They were received in the most hospitable manner by the old Emperor William I. and his Chancellor; Prince Bismarck leading Mr. Krüger, with linked arms, to dinner, and talking to him in Low German, a

dialect closely akin to Dutch. From that time the relations between the restored South African Republic and the Berlin Government were especially friendly. This emboldened the Germans at Pretoria to send their telegram to William II., at a moment when the existence of the Boer Commonwealth hung in the balance. And it was in reply to their telegraphic question that the young Emperor expressed to President Krüger his congratulation for the escape from a grave danger.

Unfortunately, this single fact was suppressed. Had it been known, the wild, though utterly unjust, outcry which arose in England would probably have been less fierce. Three or four weeks afterward, when the mail from South Africa came in, I learned the real connection of what had occurred; but in the meantime the worst mischief had been done. First impressions are apt to last; they are as difficult to eradicate as the proverbial falsehood when it is once fairly, or unfairly, started.

What creates dissatisfaction now in Germany is that, during the late diplomatic controversies between England and the South African Republic, the official or semi-official press of Berlin should have assumed an attitude which was quite uncalled for. It turned round to an extent which offended the conscience of the nation. Certainly, everybody understood that if war were to break out it was not for Germany to take part in it. At the same time, the mass of the Germans—being “honest men,” as Shakespeare says of them in one of his plays—expected that even the Government organs would not virtually play into the hands of those in England who were bent upon undoing the guaranteed independence of the Transvaal Republic. In all probability the official or semi-official press at Berlin was misled into its utterances by a belief that a compromise between England and the Boer Commonwealth would be effected, and that such a compromise would be promoted by taking sides, in a certain degree, with the demands put forth from London.

I may claim to have never shared that view. In a number of articles signed by me I over and over again expressed the conviction that war was the object of the prime movers in England, and that nothing remained for the threatened South African Republic—ay, and for the Orange Free State, too, whose fate would also be sealed if the former were subjected—than to defend its rights in alliance with the sister Republic against tremendous odds.

II.

In 1896 I was the first, I may truly say, to put the facts of the abolition of the suzerainty—which England had possessed in virtue of the Pretoria Treaty of 1881—clearly before the public in the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW. Having followed the negotiations in 1883-84, when I was in frequent contact with the Transvaal Deputation (President Krüger, General Smit, of Majuba Hill fame, and the Rev. I. S. Du Toit, the Minister of Public Instruction), I was able to give even personal testimony on that point. I can further say that when, in 1898, the Government of Pretoria met the astounding claims of suzerainty—which Mr. Chamberlain suddenly made after a lapse of thirteen years, during which Conservative and Liberal representatives of the Cabinet had openly and repeatedly confessed that no reservation of the Queen's suzerainty was expressed in the new Treaty of 1884—the arguments used by Dr. Leyds, in the name of President Krüger, were literally, and well-nigh in exactly the same order, given as had been done by me in the pages of this REVIEW.

The same may be said of the arguments used by Sir William Harcourt, Sir Edward Clarke (both eminent legists, the latter formerly a Solicitor-General in Lord Salisbury's previous Government), and other Liberal and Conservative leaders. This concurrence of views, and this remarkable coincidence, even in the marshalling of arguments and facts, may seem extraordinary. It is, however, easily explainable from the strength of the case.

Any one conversant with the text of the two Treaties and the negotiations which preceded them—as recorded in the Blue-Books—must literally come to the same conclusion. The pity is that so few politicians will take the trouble of going to the sources. I have discussed this subject for many years with a few members of Parliament, public writers and other generally well-informed men. As a rule I found among them the crassest ignorance on that particular matter. Most of them did not even know then that there were two distinct treaties, one of which had been abolished!

It was Lord Derby himself who, with his own hand, struck out everything referring to suzerainty from the old Treaty. The proof of it is contained in the Blue-Book. The suzerainty was cancelled and crossed out by him, with black lines, in the Preamble, as well as in the three paragraphs in which it is mentioned.

He then offered what he himself called "a New Treaty in substitution for the Convention of Pretoria."

A new Preamble was also given to that New Treaty. The Transvaal Deputation had come for the express object of having the suzerainty abolished and a new Treaty put in the place of the old one. They had also demanded that their country—which was until then called the "Transvaal State"—should be recognized once more as an "independent South African Republic," as it had been before the violent annexation which Mr. Disraeli had craftily effected while the burghers of the Republic were harassed by risings of the natives.

When the Transvaal Deputation returned to Pretoria, the Volks-Raad ratified the Treaty, because these objects of its Delegates had been attained. Dr. Leyds, and even Sir William Harcourt and Sir Edward Clarke, have overlooked one telling fact. It is this: While the Queen's suzerainty undoubtedly existed between 1881 and 1884, a so-called "Resident" was appointed at Pretoria to represent the British Crown in its suzerain capacity. Now, in 1884 the office of Resident was abolished and a Consul appointed in his stead. A Resident marks the country in which he acts as a vassal one. In the Parliamentary Statutes 52 and 63 Vict. (1889), c. 63, the protected Princes of India are described as "under the suzerainty of Her Majesty;" and at their Courts there is consequently a British Resident.

But in the Transvaal State, when it was restored to its old rank as the South African Republic, the Resident was replaced by a Consul, who henceforth was no longer a representative of a suzerain Protector, or Protectress, but who was, on the contrary, himself to "receive the protection of the Republic." That restored independent Commonwealth was consequently acknowledged, by this fact too, as a foreign Power, no longer under a suzerain. Hence Mr. Chamberlain himself, during the Jameson Raid—that is, evidently, when its defeat was already telegraphically known in London—declared the South African Republic, in a despatch, to be "a foreign State, a foreign Power, with which Her Majesty is at peace and in Treaty relations."

Can anything be clearer, then, than the fact of the suzerainty having been abolished? Is it not arrant hypocrisy to assert the contrary? Yet, during all the recent transactions it was con-

tinually held as a threat over the Transvaal Republic. "Conventions," in the plural, was always the word.

Not even when President Krüger proposed that the controversy about Suzerainty should be "silently dropped" on both sides, so that an agreement about the Suffrage Question might be come to, would the Colonial Secretary avoid the mention of the Conventions in the plural, as if both were still lawfully in operation! Each time, moreover, the British terms were raised.

III.

The Treaty of 1884 gives England no right whatever to interfere in the internal affairs of the South African Republic. There is not a word in it about the right of foreigners to claim equality of suffrage rights with the native Dutch inhabitants. To obtain such rights foreigners have to conform to the existing laws. These laws for obtaining the vote were originally even more liberal than those existing in England. They were only made more restrictive—that is to say, a longer term of residence was fixed before a man could become a full burgher—when seditious aspirations for the overthrow of the Republic became ripe at Johannesburg. Among the motley crowd of foreigners there, a considerable number, even according to the testimony of the more fair-minded correspondents who were sent out by papers of the war party in England, is composed of utterly worthless characters. "I have never seen," one of them wrote, "within the course of a quarter of an hour, a worse collection of rascaldom of various kinds."

When President Krüger, some years ago, visited Johannesburg, the British flag was hoisted by such immigrants as a symbol of their insurrectionary desires. When Mr. Rhodes organized the Raid, Johannesburg was in arms, though courage failed the would-be rebels at the decisive moment.

Was it reasonable, then, to expect that, in dealing with a Suffrage Question, all these occurrences should simply remain unheeded by the President, the Parliament and the burghers of the Transvaal? Could they forget the destruction of their Commonwealth between 1877 and 1881? Were they simply to allow their Republic to be voted down, after it had been found that it could not be struck down by force of arms?

For all that, in order not to have to undergo a struggle on

battle-fields with a World-Empire of nearly 400,000,000, Krüger and the Volks-Raad yielded more and more in the course of the negotiations. It was of no avail. They found themselves pressed each time by increased demands, while the English troops, of whom formerly there were but 3,000 at the Cape, were gradually increased to 25,000, and pushed forward to the frontiers of the two Republics—with even more troops announced to come afterward. Thus both Republics saw themselves menaced in their very existence, and they took the decisive, inevitable step.

In London, papers hostile to them had, in the meanwhile, before the outbreak of war, boldly declared that not suzerainty, but full Sovereignty was aimed at over the Transvaal, and that, though the Orange Free State was, by public law, as independent as Russia, British paramountcy over it, too, must be set up as a self-understood thing. In short, all respect for treaty rights and the independence of neighboring States was thrown to the winds. In Mr. Chamberlain's recent words, there must be, in South Africa, English "supremacy, preponderance, paramountcy—call it what you will, call it Abracadabra, if you choose." Out of so convenient a formula every act of violence may be evolved. Can it be wondered at that foreign nations look with mistrustful amazement upon such a doctrine? Would any country feel itself safe in the future, would any Government attach the slightest credence to the pledged word of, and the treaty stipulations accepted by, England, if Abracadabra is henceforth to be the parole?

Perhaps I may be allowed to mention here that, whatever I have done, by many writings, in furtherance of the Unionist cause of England, in opposition to Mr. Gladstone's fatal Home Rule bill, was once acknowledged by Mr. Chamberlain in terms of praise at a great public meeting. This cannot absolve me from the duty of saying what in Transvaal affairs I hold to be right. Again, I might say that when, in 1881, during the armed struggle of the burghers, there was a dark plan broached in London which would have increased the horrible Irish trouble of that time, I firmly set my face against that scheme, and it was nipped in the bud. It is as a friend of England, therefore, that I express my views.

And here I feel compelled to declare that violence is capped by unbearable cant when the hard-driven Republics, around whom the steel net was daily drawn tighter, are charged with having

brought on this hideous war. You drive a man, forsooth, into a corner. You hold your fist before his face. You threaten him by saying that the sand of the hour glass is running out, and that, unless he makes haste to kneel down, you will use other measures against him. You hold your sword and gun ready to attack him; and then when he strikes a blow, *he* is, of course, the guilty party!

I say all this with a degree of sadness. I have known a nobler England, on some great historical occasions, since I first stepped on her soil as an exile after the great Continental Revolutions of 1848-49. On not a few occasions I have come forth to defend her cause—certainly not to my personal advantage, but the contrary. But there have not been lacking cases when the policy of England has been such that I could not shirk the duty of opposing it.

IV.

It is the same now. Who can doubt that this is a war as unrighteous as it is unnecessary, and pregnant with grave perils for England's own future? Has not General Butler, a man of the fullest personal experience in South African affairs, uttered a serious warning against lighting up such a conflagration? He had to leave his post for giving that wise and earnest counsel. Has not Mr. Selous, the Nimrod of Africa, who was one of the first to open up unknown territories there, and who is, according to Lord Crewe's testimony, intimately acquainted with all the leading political personages of the Dark Continent, uttered similar warnings? Mr. Selous, himself an Imperialist, yields to none in his desire for England's greatness.

Yet, though one of the very party which wants to have the vast British Empire still further enlarged, Mr. Selous also has given warning which unfortunately was not listened to. In a long letter to the *Times*, in which he refuted the many calumnies spread about in regard to the character of the Boer population—a letter written before the outbreak of the war, but the publication of which he was ordered to withhold under an assurance given to him from influential quarters that the war would be avoided at the eleventh hour—he said:

"At present I believe that the Dutch population of the Cape Colony are as a body thoroughly loyal to the British Crown; but it cannot be

denied that Dutch Afrikander sentiment—the idea of becoming an independent nation—which was first aroused in South Africa by the unjust annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, and became stronger in 1880-81, gathered an extraordinary impetus at the time of the Jameson Raid. A war forced upon the Transvaal now by a demand for concessions which, however moderate they may appear in this country, are yet thought by the leaders of the South African Dutch in the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State to be unreasonable, will, as soon as the blood of their kinsmen is shed beyond the Vaal, make one people of them—a people that will be from henceforth bitterly, though possibly for a long time to come passively, hostile to British domination. Such a contingency should surely be avoided if possible, and surely the matter in dispute between Mr. Krüger and the Uitlanders might be settled by a Court of Arbitration formed from amongst the highest jurists of all the different States of South Africa. But, of course, if all arbitration or discussion of the points in dispute should be arbitrarily refused by the Colonial Secretary, it is difficult to see how war can be avoided; for the Transvaal Boers are an obstinate people, and will probably rather fight than climb down very low. In that case we shall have entered upon a course which, though it may give us the gold fields of the Transvaal for the present and the immediate future, *will infallibly lose us the whole of South Africa as a British possession within the lifetime of many men who are now living.* Through arrogance and ignorance Great Britain lost her American Colonies, and if arrogance and ignorance prevail in the present conduct of affairs in South Africa, history will repeat itself in that country."

Arrogance and ignorance have prevailed. The blood guiltiness of the war now raging lies, according to Mr. Selous's showing, at the door of the English Government. Arbitration would have prevented it. And arbitration between foreign Powers—of which Mr. Chamberlain acknowledged, in 1895-96, the South African Republic to be one—is perfectly feasible. But then he suddenly altered his standpoint. Contrary to his own clear assertion, he all at once declared, in open disregard of the Treaty of 1884, that England was the suzerain, the South African Republic the vassal.

When the lives of the captured Raiders were at stake, and a sentence of death had legally to be pronounced against them at Pretoria, it was found convenient in London to treat President Krüger with great courtesy. The Republic, which had escaped from a great danger, showed itself generous toward the prisoners. None of them was executed. Their sentences were commuted to fines. Their leader was handed over to England. President Krüger was praised by the Colonial Secretary for his magnanimity.

I may mention here a personal incident showing what most people in England expected at the time. The son of a well-known English sculptor had been among Dr. Jameson's men, and was

made prisoner at Krügersdorp. His mother, whom I had met in society, came in great distress to my house, expressing a fear that her son would be shot forthwith; she entreated me to intercede with President Krüger, with whom she had heard I was acquainted. I told her I was perfectly sure that no such fate would befall her son, and that the most likely thing—nay, I should say the certainty—was that he, being only one of the men and not an officer in the Raid, would soon be released. Immediately afterward the news came that he was set free.

In those days it was found useful in England to express hopes of "magnanimous" treatment being given to the prisoners; for everybody knew what would have been done by English justice to piratical raiders that had fallen into its hands. The capital punishment dealt out to raiders and insurgents in the Ionian Islands and in Canada is too well remembered to need special mention. Fearing the worst for Jameson and his companions, the English authorities were careful not to offend the South African Republic, but rather tried to humor it, so as to induce it to perform an act of generosity. Years afterward, however, it was to be pushed into vassalage, and bullied into armed resistance, so that its gold fields might be seized after a conquest. It was lightly assumed that this would be an easy war. After recent events, the *Times* has avowed that the advisers of Government were rather mistaken in their view.

V.

When the South African Republic at last mobilized its militia forces of yeomen in defense of its independence, London papers declared that this was not war, but simply a revolt—a revolt of the vassal. "The Boer Revolt" was used, day by day, as a title for the war news. The English Government itself refrained from mentioning the word "war." The supporters of Government asserted that the sending out of 25,000, of 50,000, perhaps of 70,000, men, or, if need be, even more, was simply "a *police* measure for the restoration of *order*" in the revolted territory of the Suzerain.

Imagine the consequences this would have had for the English soldiers now in Boer captivity, if the Governments at Pretoria and Bloemfontein had taken reprisals for such treatment as mere

“rebels”! Happily, those Governments were more humane, and acted as belligerent foreign Powers toward their prisoners.

Compare, again, the refusal of the English Government to acknowledged these Republics as belligerent Powers with what, in May, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain had said in the House of Commons:

“In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Krüger, an ultimatum which would have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war; it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war. It would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Krüger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, in which Secretaries of State, standing in this place, have repudiated all right of interference—that would be a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise.”

Some months before that speech, which confirms everything Mr. Selous has said, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons:

“I do not say that under the terms of the Convention we are entitled to force reforms on President Krüger, but we are entitled to give him friendly counsel. . . . If this friendly counsel was not well received, there was not the slightest intention on the part of Her Majesty’s Government to press it. . . . I am perfectly willing to withdraw it, and to seek a different solution if it should not prove acceptable to the President. The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce.”

Mark that Mr. Chamberlain here spoke in February, 1896, of the Convention—not of “Conventions.” That latter idea came as an afterthought to him in 1897. In 1896, he still again said, when speaking of the Franchise Question:

“The answer that has hitherto been given, not on the part of the Government of the Transvaal, but on the part of some of its friends, was that to grant this request would be to commit suicide, inasmuch as, the moment the majority got the franchise, the first use they would make of it would be to turn out the existing Government of the Transvaal and substitute a Government of their own liking. [‘Hear, hear,’ and laughter.] I confess I thought there was some reason in that objection. It is rather difficult to attempt to persuade any one so capable as President Krüger that it would be desirable that he should proceed to his own extinction, and accordingly I brought before him an alternative suggestion which, at all events, would relieve him from that

difficulty. . . . The question is, whether President Krüger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does, he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it."

In subsequent speeches, Mr. Chamberlain once more laid stress on the fact of the Dutch population being the large majority in South Africa, and on the great danger of the policy of going to war in opposition to the Dutch sentiment in the Cape Colony and in the Orange Free State. Even as late as August, 1896, answering Sir Ashmead Bartlett, Mr. Chamberlain said:

"What is the policy which the honorable gentleman would put forward if he were standing here in my place? We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Krüger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date the British Government would interfere by force. Then, I suppose, he would come here and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which [laughter]—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Krüger to grant reforms in regard to which not only this Government, but successive Secretaries of State, have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs. That is the policy of the honorable gentleman. That is not my policy."

Is it not? Instead of 10,000 men, 25,000 are now out there, with double that number, or more, to follow. A vote for £10,000,000 has been taken; and another will, in all likelihood, have to be asked for. All the declarations formerly made have thus been falsified.

VI.

A word has now to be said about that alleged Boer "oligarchy" of which men contemptuously speak, who submissively salaam before the most antiquated forms and institutions of a Monarchy which still calls itself "by right divine," though in historical truth it is the issue of a successful Whig aristocratic Revolution.

The Boer oligarchy of the South African Republic is composed of simple farmers, every man of whom, from the age of sixteen up to sixty—nay, even mere boys of thirteen and men past seventy—stand together now on blood-soaked battle-fields for the defense of their country. That is their "corrupt" way of doing things. They have to meet the hired soldiers of an Empire in which, even after many hard popular struggles, a "hereditary oligarchy"—as Sir Wilfrid Lawson called it a few days ago—

still wields an extraordinary political and social power, while the Crown, going on the old Norman maxim, "*Dieu et mon droit*," declares war, and makes peace, according to its own fancy.

I remember the time—it was long before Mr. Chamberlain had entered political life—when, out of about nine or ten million adult men in the United Kingdom, not more than one million had the vote. Strictly speaking, there were perhaps only eight hundred thousand to nine hundred thousand; for there were, as there are still, cumulative votes which an individual might possess. Elections not taking place everywhere on the same day, a man might cast his vote here and there, in town and country—as a householder, as a land owner, as a member of a university, and so forth.

What repeated violent struggles has it cost during the last thirty-five years—not to mention the Chartist agitation between the thirties and the beginning of the fifties—in order to obtain successive small instalments of electoral reform! I have vividly before my mind's eye the day when London was on the verge of revolution. I saw my friend, Mr. Edmund Beales, the leader of the Suffrage movement, sitting, before the march of the masses to Hyde Park, in the office of the Reform League, pale from excitement, with hat drawn over his brow, expecting, in much anxiety, the very worst. The Queen's troops were lying in ambush to prevent the entrance of the masses into the Park. Blood, it was feared, would be spilt, and unspeakable scenes of riot would then occur in those quarters of the working classes where there is an admixture of the criminal element. The railings of Hyde Park were on that day thrown down by the onset of the tumultuous crowds; an event at which I was personally present. Fortunately, the Queen, at the last moment, countermanded the order for the action of the troops. So I heard afterward from a friend in the War Office.

Again London had to be the scene of mass demonstrations, years afterward, in order to carry a measure for the partial enfranchisement of the rural population. To this day, nevertheless, there is no manhood suffrage. Some three to four millions are outside the pale of the electorate. I state this as a simple fact, knowing well enough that an indiscriminate right of suffrage among the utterly uninstructed may sometimes be the very means of overthrowing freedom and hindering intellectual and social progress.

But if considerations like these have weight with politicians

in England, is a young African Republic, in its struggle for life, not entitled to look round as well, in franchise matters, for the sake of avoiding danger?

England has a hereditary House of Lords, which may cancel any Act passed by the Representatives of the People. Is that oligarchy, or not? Is it right, broadly speaking, to assume that capacity for legislation goes by heredity? I believe England has escaped from a great public danger through the rejection of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill. But I doubt whether the House of Lords, in thus acting, was moved exclusively by patriotic instincts, so many of its members having landed estates in Ireland, and being rather fond of retaining their oligarchical privileges.

Since the Norman conquest, the real tillers of the English soil have been dispossessed of the land. Their number continually decreases. They are mere hands, landless wage-laborers, living in cottages not their own, from which they may be driven out, week by week, if it so pleases the aristocratic land owner or the large farmer he has put over them. Is it for a country with such feudal land-laws, the like of which does not exist in any European country, to speak of the free yeomen of the Boer Commonwealths as an "oligarchy"?

Again, looking at the ever increasing proletariat in the unwholesomely expanding large towns, to which the landless laborers flock for better means of support, would it not be better to deal in England itself with the root of a crying evil, than to fall upon a foreign Republic under the false plea of an oligarchy holding sway there?

VII.

The Dutch people of Cape Colony, according to Mr. Chamberlain's statement, made as late as April, 1896, "are just as loyal to the throne and to the British connection as, let me say, our French-Canadian fellow-subjects in the Dominion of Canada." In a speech made two months before, he said:

"We are constantly reminded of the fact that our Dutch fellow-citizens are in a majority in South Africa, and I think I may say for myself as for my predecessor that we are prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious thing—a matter involving most serious considerations—if we are asked to go to war in opposition to Dutch sentiment."

The loyalty of that population at the Cape was publicly

acknowledged in England when its Legislature made a yearly grant of £30,000 for increasing the English fleet in view of a possible conflict with France. This is an occurrence of quite recent date. Yet, all of a sudden, the waters were said to have been troubled, and the world was mysteriously told about a tremendous conspiracy for establishing a vast Afrikander Republic, involving the overthrow of English dominion at the Cape! For which deep reason the Transvaal was to be fallen upon, because there was the high seat of a great ambition. A sorrier farce it would have been impossible to concoct.

It is the *auri sacra fames*, the damnable hunger after gold, which has brought about this terrible war, in which, at any moment, the savage native races may come up to play their part with barbarous ferocity, to the terror and destruction of women and children left helpless in solitary farms. Is it to be wondered at that the kinsmen of the Transvaal people at the Cape, and in their original home in the Netherlands, are filled with indignation and deep wrath, and that there is an echo in the indignant voice of the whole civilized world?

Every close observer who has visited South Africa, even when going there with a biased mind, has usually come back with the conviction that it was in England's own interest not to act again as the aggressor toward the Transvaal Republic. England obtained forcible possession of the Cape Colony while Holland was overrun by France and lay under her iron heel. The Dutch inhabitants of that Colony, whose forefathers had created the settlement and introduced laws and institutions which hold good to this day, felt for a long time the foreign yoke imposed upon them. They, nevertheless, became, in course of time, perfectly loyal to the connection with England. This loyalty was put to a severe strain when that section of the Dutch inhabitants which first emigrated to Natal and then to the land beyond the river Vaal was relentlessly pursued by English troops.

The strain became still more severe by the lawless overthrow in 1877 of the Transvaal Republic, in the midst of its difficulties with the black natives. When in 1881—after several defeats of English detachments, chiefly at Majuba Hill—peace was concluded and a compromise effected, the Dutch population at the Cape applauded this tardy and even incomplete act of justice. Tardy and incomplete it was, for Mr. Gladstone, shortly before en-

tering office, had characterized the annexation effected by Mr. Disraeli as a deed of downright "insanity," and acknowledged the right of the Boers to the restoration of their full independence in the most uncompromising terms.

Among those who had opposed the conclusion of peace in 1881 after the battle of Majuba Hill was the late Lord Randolph Churchill, a Conservative. Having in later years visited South Africa, he saw his error. This is what he wrote in "Men, Mines and Animals in South Africa :'

"The surrender of the Transvaal, and the peace concluded by Mr. Gladstone with the victors of Majuba Hill, were at the time, and still are, the object of sharp criticism and bitter denunciation from many politicians at home, *quorum pars parva fui*. Better and more precise information, combined with cool reflection, leads me to the conclusion that had the British Government of that day taken advantage of its strong military position and annihilated, as it could easily have done, the Boer forces, it would indeed have regained the Transvaal, but it might have lost the Cape Colony. The Dutch sentiment in the Colony had been so exasperated by what it considered to be the unjust, faithless and arbitrary policy pursued toward the free Dutchmen of the Transvaal by Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Theophilus Shepstone and Sir Owen Lanyon that the final triumph of the British arms, merely by brute force, would have permanently and hopelessly alienated it from Great Britain. Parliamentary government in a country where the Dutch control the Parliament would have become impossible, and without Parliamentary government Cape Colony would be ungovernable. The actual magnanimity of the peace with the Boers concluded by Mr. Gladstone's Ministry after two humiliating military reverses suffered by the arms under their control, became plainly apparent to the just and sensible mind of the Dutch Cape Colonist, atoned for much of past grievance, and demonstrated the total absence in the English mind of any hostility or unfriendliness to the Dutch race. Concord between Dutch and English in the Colony from that moment became possible, and that concord the Government of Mr. Rhodes inaugurated and has since to all appearances firmly riveted."

Lord Randolph Churchill wrote that before the Raid which Mr. Rhodes treacherously organized, after having attained to power at the Cape by the Dutch. It is easy to imagine what the late Tory statesman would have written on that subject after the disgraceful event. The conviction with which Lord Randolph Churchill became imbued, after he had studied matters on the spot, that the Transvaal would have been overcome, but that the Cape Colony might have been lost, is certainly a notable one in a Conservative. One thing only he forgot: Not only had Mr. Gladstone to think of the feelings of the Dutch population in the

Colony, but also of the tremendous Irish difficulty in which England was then involved. It was a difficulty so great that it could scarcely be mastered by a garrison of 40,000 men in the unruly Sister Isle.

Nowhere is greater regret expressed at the existing state of things than among those German Liberal Constitutionalists who until now had steadfastly stood by England, trying to uphold her as an example of representative Government in opposition to their own Government's doings. They now turn away sorrowfully—nay, with expressions of open disgust.

It is with a greater sorrow than I can express that I have written all this. I deeply feel the danger to which this country, in which I have spent the better part of my life, has exposed itself with a light heart, in spite of an ever more darkening prospect of the future. But though so many ties bind me to England—nay, I will say for that very reason—I hold it to be a duty to speak out fearlessly, even as I did against Governments of my own native country when they outraged right and justice and kept Italians and Hungarians under their iron heel. This is the duty which I owe to the better England; and here I fulfil it.

KARL BLIND.